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Introduction 
One of the most central aspects of the free will debate is whether we can still have free 
will if determinism is true. To frame this question appropriately we first need to define 
determinism and what it means to have free will. Philosophers generally agree about how 
to define the thesis of determinism: determinism is the claim that every event that occurs 
can be explained by the conjunction of past events and laws of nature. The concept of 
free will is more controversial to define. This is because one can have either a 
deflationary or inflationary account of free will. 1  Generally, deflated accounts of free 
will only require that we are, in some sense, the source of our actions. Philosophers can 
be inflationary or deflationary in respect to what it means to be the source of our actions. 
An inflationary account of being the source of our actions is that to be a source, we must 
be the ultimate source, or the only cause of our actions. Conversely, some argue that we 
can achieve partial source by doing the actions we reflectively endorse, and this enough 
sourcehood to have free will. An inflated account of free will not only requires a sense of 
sourcehood, but also that we have alternative possibilities, or that we have the freedom to 
choose our desired action among other alternative actions. 
Since there are so many possible conceptions of free will, it is also difficult to 
decipher how the truth of determinism impacts free will. Incompatibilists believe that the 
proper conception of free will is necessarily incompatible with determinism. Conversely, 
compatibilists believe that the proper conception of free will is compatible with 
determinism.  However, both incompatibilists and compatibilists support their respective 
                                                             
1The idea that different aspects of free will can be inflationary or deflationary was presented to me by Jim 
Kreines. He presented this framework to my Senior Seminar class in Fall 2010. 
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conclusion for a variety of reasons. For instance, Peter Van Inwagen argued for 
incompatibilism by claiming that determinism necessarily prevents us from having 
genuine alternatives.  Other philosophers such as Derk Pereboom have gone further to 
say that determinism also necessarily prevents us from being the sources of our actions in 
meaningful ways.  
Since Van Inwagen, most compatibilists have conceded that determinism is 
incompatible with alternative possibilities. They have instead tried to show that free will 
does not require alternate possibilities. They claim instead that a deflated sense of 
sourcehood or ownership over our actions is enough to have free will. However, Hilary 
Bok takes a much different approach. She argues that Van Inwagen only shows that we 
can’t have alternate possibilities in a metaphysical sense. That is, if we explain how the 
world is, it is such where there is only one possible set of events that can occur. However, 
we can still have genuine alternatives in an epistemic sense. She argues that since we 
cannot know which alternatives are metaphysically possible, we still have reason to 
regard our future as open. This is the case because either cannot know what we will do in 
the future or cannot use our foreknowledge to limit our epistemic alternatives.  
In a sense, Bok account is inflationary in that she requires both alternative 
possibilities and sourcehood for free will. However, she is deflationary in what those 
requirements entail. To be an alternative possibility she only requires that our future be 
epistemically open, rather than metaphysically.  To be the source of our actions, Bok 
believes that we must be able to, “attain some critical distance from (our various 
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motivations or desires that we act on) and choose which to endorse.”2 This is deflationary 
in that while her version of sourcehood requires a level of reflective endorsement, it does 
not require us to be the ultimate source of our actions in a causal sense.  
Her specific argument involves three distinct steps. First she argues that existence 
of a dialectical stalemate between compatibilists and incompatibilists shows that 
conditional possibility is a coherent way to think about possibility. Second, she argues 
that conditional possibility is necessary for practical reasoning, and that practical 
reasoning requires that we have multiple epistemic alternatives.  Finally, Bok argues the 
truth of determinism and the existence of foreknowledge cannot interfere with our 
practical reasoning or epistemic alternatives. Therefore, it is rational to see these 
alternatives as genuine.  
Through evaluating Bok’s argument, I hope to shed light on the overall question 
of whether we can have free will if determinism is true. In the first two chapters I will 
fully explain and break down Bok’s argument for genuine epistemic alternatives. In 
chapter three I will evaluate the success of Bok’s arguments. Specifically, I will offer a 
variety of intuitive examples to show that epistemic unpredictability is not enough to 
make our alternatives genuine. I will then use more examples to consider the relative 
importance of unpredictability and endorsement to free will.  
                                                             
2 Bok, Freedom and Practical Reason, 162. 
Chapter One: Dialectical Stalemates 
Bok’s first argument for the existence of conditional possibility rests on her claim 
that incompatibilists and compatibilists have reached a “dialectical stalemate.” She 
believes that philosophers are using different meanings of what is to that say that an 
action is “possible” and that this discrepancy is the main issue dividing the two camps. 
Furthermore, she says that because there is a dialectical stalemate, incompatibilists and 
compatibilists should abandon appealing to intuitive examples to directly defeat their 
opponents’ arguments. This is a fairly drastic departure from previous work on free will 
and therefore deserves serious consideration. In order to decipher Bok’s proposed 
stalemate, I will examine three issues: (1) the definition of a dialectical stalemate (2) 
whether there is a dialectical stalemate in this case and (3) what is the appropriate 
philosophical method to adopt in the face of a dialectical stalemate. 
Definition of Stalemate 
Often times a philosopher will support a view by offering examples or intuitions 
that support certain underlying principles, and then use those underlying principles to 
defend some major claim. However, there are times when an opponent can use the same 
intuitive examples to support a different underlying principle that does not support that 
same major claim. According to John Martin Fischer, who originally came up with the 
concept, a dialectical stalemate occurs when there are two competing principles where 
the only difference is that one is more deflated than the other, and there is no clear way to 
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decisively affirm or reject either.3 Therefore, to show that there is a dialectal stalemate, 
one must show that either (1) the proponent of the claim cannot use an example to 
establish the stronger principle without presupposing that principle or the overall claim 
and (2) and the opponent cannot refute the stronger principle without presupposing their 
own weaker principle or altered major claim.  
Bok echoes this definition by saying that a dialectical stalemate is a situation 
where “proponents of opposing views can explain our intuitions about various examples 
using different principles, and in which any example which seems to support one 
principle over the other can legitimately be rejected on the grounds that it presupposes the 
view it is meant to support.”4 In both definitions, there are two main claims about what 
qualifies as a dialectical stalemate. The first is that there must be multiple ways to explain 
our intuitions based on different principles. The second, more complicated assertion is 
that there is no way to directly defeat one view using the other because each view follows 
necessarily from their basic assumptions. These two criteria will become important in 
evaluating whether Bok has found a genuine dialectical stalemate in the case of the free 
will debate. 
After defining dialectical stalemates, it is easy to see why we might have them in 
the free will debate; oftentimes incompatibilism and compatibilism are separated by 
whether their proponents inflate or deflate concepts and requirements related to free will, 
such as control, sourcehood, possibility, and others. Because of this, there can be many 
situations where there are sets of principles where one is more deflated than the other. We 
                                                             
3 Fisher, Metaphysics of Free Will, 85.  
4  Bok, Freedom and Practical Reason, 135. 
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need to be able to sort out dialectical stalemates in order to figure out what exactly it 
means to have free will, and consequently shed light on the relationship between free will 
and determinism. 
Does a Dialectical Stalemate Apply? 
Bok’s proposed dialectical stalemate occurs between incompatibilists and 
compatibilist using different notions of possibility as underlying principles. The major 
claim Bok argues can be undermined is Van Inwagen’s argument for incompatibilism. 
Van Inwagen claims that:  
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature 
and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, 
and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these 
things (including our present acts) are not up to us.5  
Bok argues that this claim hinges on a certain sense of possibility, namely, what is 
possible for the agent to do in fact, or possibility tout court. Bok would say that Van 
Inwagen’s claim is supported by the underlying principle of possibility tout court. 
However, Bok argues that a weaker principle, conditional possibility, is consistent with 
all of Van Inwagen’s examples supporting the principle of possibility tout court yet 
opposes Van Inwagen’s incompatibilist claim. Furthermore, Bok argues that even though 
conditional possibility can undermine Van Inwagen’s examples, there is no way to 
decisively establish conditional possibility as right based on intuition alone. 
In order for this case to fit the definition of a dialectical stalemate, Bok must first 
show that these two versions of possibility provide multiple ways to explain our 
                                                             
5 Van Inwagen, An Argument For Incompatibilism, 39. 
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intuitions, especially as they relate to Van Inwagen’s examples. Then she must show that 
there is no way for one version to directly defeat the other because they necessarily 
follow from presupposed assumptions. Before examining whether Bok’s dialectical 
stalemate is genuine, it would be helpful to give a fuller account of each version of 
possibility. 
Possibility Tout court 
Bok defines possibility tout court as what is possible when one considers every 
fact pertaining to a certain situation - namely, states of the universe, events of the past, 
and any other relevant information as to whether an event is possible. This inflated sense 
of possibility takes into account what causes our action. If determinism is true, there can 
only ever be one possibility. For instance, while a snow cone could melt in a conditional 
sense, if events of the past make it so that particular snow cone will always be in a sub-
zero climate, than that snow cone melting is not possible using possibility tout court. It 
seems clear that possibility tout court is an underlying principle of Van Inwagen’s claim. 
He argues we cannot do anything outside of what the conjunction of laws of nature and 
events in the past cause us to do. This sense of “can” implicitly uses the underlying 
principle of possibility tout court, or that possibilities are necessarily limited by events of 
the past.  
Conditional Possibility 
Bok’s conditional possibility captures what is possible in a broad sense because it 
only takes into account the laws of nature, but ignores states of the universe and events of 
the past.  For instance, to say it is possible for a snow cone to melt is to say that at any 
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given time any snow cone always has a chance of melting regardless of the state of the 
universe or events of the past. Even if the snow cone was in the south pole, and the events 
of the past made it such that the world was about to enter an ice age, it would still be 
possible that the snow could melt in a conditional sense because we choose to ignore 
certain facts about the state of the universe and the events of the past. Conversely, it is 
not conditionally possible for the snow cone to turn into a kitten, start talking, or grow 
wings. This is because none of these qualities could be attributed to a snow cone in any 
scenario if our current laws of nature obtain. Therefore, there would be no way to ignore 
coherent possibilities to the point where the snow cone could take on any those qualities 
because a snow cone could not ever take on those qualities at all.    
Now that I have sketched Bok’s concepts of two different types of possibility, we 
need to consider whether they match the requirements for a dialectical stalemate. The 
first criterion is that they must provide multiple ways to explain our intuitions about free 
will. Bok believes they do because the different notions of possibility themselves result 
from two separate mixed intuitions about free will; (1) If I perform an action because I 
choose to do so, then I perform it freely and (2) If I perform an action because something 
else causes me to do so, then I do not perform it freely. She then points out that 
determinism implies that the actions we normally call “free” are caused by choices which 
are themselves caused, ultimately by external causes, and therefore our intuitions 
inherently give us both reasons to affirm and deny that we perform actions freely.6   
                                                             
6 Bok Freedom and Practical Reason 
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The second criterion is that there is no way to directly defeat one view using the 
other because each view follows necessarily from each of their basic assumptions. As a 
matter of definition, conditional probability abstracts events of the past so that they 
cannot be used to narrow down one’s possible alternatives. Therefore, the only criteria 
we can use to narrow possibilities are the laws of nature. When we use the principle of 
conditional possibility, we are able to use the criteria that the aforementioned snow cone 
is capable of melting or freezing, but we reject the idea of using any other information we 
learn, including events of the past, to provide more detailed circumstances. This could be 
information that the snow cone has been sitting in the South Pole for the past ten years or 
that all signs up until now suggest we are entering an ice age. 
 Since all of Van Inwagen’s examples support the principle of possibility that 
necessarily considers all relevant information, there will not be an example that fits Van 
Inwagen’s principle but not the principle of conditional possibility. The compatibilist can 
simply abstract the unwanted information away to refute his claims. In this sense, Van 
Inwagen cannot defeat conditional possibility directly, or by using examples that support 
his overall incompatibilist claim. Furthermore, while the principle of conditional 
possibility will work to undermine Van Inwagen’s arguments, it cannot defeat Van 
Inwagen’s overall claim about incompatibilism without presupposing conditional 
probability.  
What does a Dialectical Stalemate Imply?  
In the sense I describe above, it seems that Bok may have indeed reached a 
dialectical stalemate. However, what a dialectical stalemate actually entails is more 
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modest than it may initially imply. It simply means that specific formulations of 
arguments cannot be formulated as to force us to accept the overall claim, that 
determinism is incompatible over its counterclaim. However, it seems like there are other 
options available, such as arguing as to which supporting principle to use, or finding a 
different principle to support the overall claim that avoids the stalemate altogether. So 
which option should we take? To figure it out, it would be helpful to ask the question - 
what is the appropriate course of action in the face of a dialectical stalemate? 
One option which Fischer suggests is to fundamentally restructure the argument 
to make each position clearer, or to “exhibit the structure of the problem in such a way 
that the competing positions are naturally associated with competing “intuitive pictures”7 
Notice that Fischer does not recommend we abandon our intuitions, but rather 
emphasizes them further by more precisely assigning them to competing claims. 
However, Bok believes this would be unhelpful, and instead prescribes that:  
…we should abandon the attempt to convince our opponents that intuitions, 
examples, or ordinary language decisively favor our view, not only because such 
arguments are unlikely to convince them, but because the fact that we have reached a 
dialectical stalemate shows that such arguments are unsound. Instead we should admit 
that there are several apparently legitimate ways of using the contested terms… and that 
we will probably not find any example which will decisively show that one way of using 
these terms is right. Having made this concession, we should then proceed to ask what 
reasons we have to use the contested terms in either of these legitimate ways in the cases 
under discussion8 
So where does this leave Bok? In a favorable reading of her intentions Bok is 
saying that we simply should not aim for decisiveness. Furthermore, Bok’s claim still 
allows both incompatibilist and compatibilist reasons to argue directly over which 
                                                             
7 Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will, 86. 
8 Bok, Freedom and Practical Reason, 136‐137. 
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conception of possibility to adopt. However, it is important to recognize that the 
existence of a dialectical stalemate does not inherently necessitate examining what 
reasons we have to accept each principle. It is rather one strategy among many that may 
serve to make the position of accepting a certain principle of possibility more plausible.  
A broader lesson to take away is that when debating free will, like many 
philosophical problems, the goal is not to find a decisive answer. Instead, many 
philosophers precisely define what holding a particular view entails, and then make one 
view seem more or less appealing by considering those refinements. Fischer states this 
idea well, saying that, “Wisdom in philosophy consists partly in recognizing that one 
should not expect decisive arguments in most contexts.”9 With this in mind, I will move 
on to examine Bok’s further arguments for accepting the principle of conditional 
probability knowing that it is only one piece that can help use to more precisely grasp and 
untangle the larger issue what it means for an action to be possible.  
                                                             
9 Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will, 85. 
Chapter 2: Genuine Alternatives from an Epistemic Perspective 
Through her discussion dialectical stalemates, Bok shows there are two coherent 
and competing conceptions of possibility.  Possibility tout court supports the overall 
claim that determinism is incompatible with a person having genuine alternatives while 
conditional possibility does not.  Now that she has shown there is no fatal flaw by which 
one can directly defeat the other, she must present different reasons for why we should 
adopt one conception rather than the other. 
If, as Bok argues, there is truly a dialectical stalemate, then conditional possibility 
is a coherent way to interpret what we mean when say we can perform a certain action. In 
a sense, Bok uses the dialectical stalemate to get conditional possibility on the table, and 
show it is a legitimate alternative to possibility tout court. Now she must go onto show 
why conditional possibility is relevant to free will. She will do this by attempting to show 
that the alternatives we having using conditional possibility are genuine. Finally, Bok 
must show why conditional possibility is more relevant to free will than possibility tout 
court. To do this, she must show why the alternatives that stem from using conditional 
possibility are more relevant to free will than the one inevitable alternative provided by 
possibility tout court. 
In this chapter I will lay out Bok’s view, as well as some basic responses other 
philosophers have made against her view. I will then go on to present my own evaluative 
judgments in chapter three.  
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The Genuine Alternatives Worry 
The first and most basic question that Bok faces is why we should ever use 
conditional possibility at all. For as Bok says, “From the fact that we have decided to 
ignore some feature of her situation, it does not follow that that feature has ceased to 
exist; nor does the fact that we have chosen to disregard the ways in which it limits her 
options imply that those limitations no longer constrain her.”10 
This worry gets at the heart of the incompatibilist intuition: even though there 
appear to be multiple options available to us at any given time, the truth of determinism 
entails that these options are an illusion. Even if we can abstract information to get back 
to that illusion, the abstraction in itself does not really help us, because there is no good 
reason to believe that our options are genuine. Bok disagrees with this intuition, and 
therefore her goal is to show that rather than just having an illusion of free will under 
determinism, we actually have it in some meaningful sense that requires genuine 
alternatives. With this in mind, I will outline Bok’s account of how conditional 
possibility can provide us with genuine alternatives.  
Theoretical Reasoning (Possibility Tout court) and Practical Reasoning (Conditional 
Possibility) 
In order to build an account of how conditional possibility matters to free will, 
Bok first claims that conditional possibility and possibility tout court are each 
fundamental to different types of reasoning: practical reasoning and theoretical reasoning. 
The difference between theoretical and practical reasoning, and why they require 
                                                             
10 Bok, Freedom and Practical Reason, 138. 
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different senses of possibility, is they ask fundamentally different questions that can only 
be answered using their respective types of possibility.  
When we use theoretical reasoning, it is to answer the question, what is the world 
like? We seek to explain events from a metaphysical perspective. So when we look at 
alternate possibilities from this perspective, we would ask, based on what we know about 
the past and laws of nature, what are all the different alternatives the world could take? 
When we use practical reasoning, we ask what we have most reason to do: what options 
do I have in front of me at this moment? This requires us to form a set of possible actions 
(in the conditional sense) and then deliberate about which we have most reason to 
perform.  
In the change from theoretical to practical reasoning, the question shifts from a 
third person, explanatory perspective to a first person, deliberative perspective. In terms 
of discovering the different alternatives for actions, asking the question of what we have 
reason to do is, at least initially, an epistemic one, because we ask ourselves, what 
options do I know I have? Then we can go on to deliberate which of those epistemic 
options we have the most reason to choose.  
  After distinguishing between theoretical and practical reasoning, we see that, in 
addition to different types of possibility, the stalemate also entails different “modes” in 
which we reason. This is implied, Bok believes, by the inherent and exclusive link 
between each sense of possibility and their respective mode of reasoning. Theoretical 
reasoning takes a metaphysical view of the world, where as practical reasoning requires 
an epistemic view. Just like with the original stalemate, the key to Bok’s argument is that 
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there is no way for one form of reasoning to directly defeat the other. Specifically, this 
requires that it is impossible to use theoretical reasoning to answer the question “What do 
I have most reason to do?”  That is, we can’t answer epistemic questions about our 
actions from a metaphysical perspective. Bok will attempt to show this through a thought 
experiment later, but first it will be helpful to look at the general incompatibilist reply to 
give a fuller picture of what each side believes is the relationship between epistemic 
questions and metaphysical explanations . 
Incompatibilist Response 
Many incompatibilists argue against the claim that it is impossible to answer 
epistemic questions using metaphysical explanations. We have the most reason to do 
what we are in fact going to do, so we can answer the question of what we have most 
reason to do through theoretical reasoning. This means that we cannot deliberate, but that 
is simply because deliberation is also incompatible with determinism. Deliberation 
requires that you need to genuinely believe you could do some action A or some action B 
while you deliberate. To illustrate this, Van Inwagen gives an example of a person who is 
sitting in a room with two doors and knows one of them is locked. It doesn’t make sense 
to deliberate as to which door to leave through, because no matter which you decide, you 
will only be able to leave through one, no matter how much you deliberate.11 Since you 
can’t actually do both and only one option is actually open, then in order to deliberate 
you must either be ignorant or contradict yourself. To this type of incompatibilist, if 
                                                             
11 Van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will, 154. 
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determinism is true, we do in fact make ourselves ignorant to the fact of determinism 
whenever we deliberate.    
To incompatibilists, deliberation must result in a metaphysically free choice in 
order to be coherent and meaningful. However, compatibilists would not concede this. 
Fischer proposes that deliberation is a process, rather than a mechanism for free choice. 
All he requires for deliberation is “that I have an interest in figuring out what I have 
sufficient reason to choose, and that I do not know which course of action I will in fact 
choose to take (and take).” 12  According to Fischer, deliberation can be compatible with 
determinism because there is an epistemic gap that exists between our current knowledge 
and the outcome of deliberation. Even if we know that our decisions are determined 
solely by existing psychological causes operating on us, “it does not follow that I know 
what decision I will make and what action I will perform.”13 Essentially, as long as we 
don’t know what we are determined, we can still decide which door to choose to open, 
which is enough to save deliberation from being incompatible with determinism.  
Notice that Bok’s argument makes a stronger claim. While Fischer simply claims 
that deliberation is coherent as long as we do not know which alternative is genuine, Bok 
claims that we have reason to regard all alternatives as genuine. Fischer believes that 
deliberation is coherent because we don’t know our own metaphysical explanations; that 
is, we don’t have access to foreknowledge. If we did gain access to foreknowledge about 
our future through theoretical reasoning, then that knowledge would render deliberation 
useless and compromise our freedom. In this case, Fischer says “My view is the opposite 
                                                             
12 Fischer, Free Will and Moral Responsibility, 326.  
13 Fischer,  Free Will and Moral Responsibility, 7. 
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of the famous Biblical contention that the truth shall make us free.  But this is really not 
surprising: if I genuinely knew all my future choices and behavior, then it would seem to 
me that I could just sit back and let the future unroll.”14  However, Bok believes that even 
we had perfect theoretical reasoning skills, we either could not have foreknowledge or we 
couldn’t use that foreknowledge in deciding how to act. Therefore, it could never be the 
case that we could “just sit back and let the future unroll.”  
Pocket Oracle 
Since Bok claims that it is impossible to use theoretical reasoning to answer 
epistemic questions regarding our own actions, then she needs to account for 
foreknowledge made possible by determinism.  To do this, she presents a thought 
experiment involving a “Pocket Oracle.” 15 The Pocket Oracle is an infallible predictor 
that uses theoretical reasoning to calculate our future actions based on past events and the 
laws of nature. Therefore, anything that the Pocket Oracle tells you will happen is 
guaranteed to actually happen. The Pocket Oracle acts as a way for us to consider the 
impact of determinism on deliberation.  Bok shows that even with a Pocket Oracle, not 
only is deliberation possible, but necessary because there is no way the Pocket Oracle can 
predict our actions if our actions depend on that prediction.  To illustrate this, Bok asks to 
imagine a case where we are about to flip a coin, and ask the Pocket Oracle whether we 
are going to choose heads or tails. She claims: 
In either case, the Pocket Oracle would know what I would do if it predicted that I would 
choose heads and what I would do if it predicted I would choose tails. But because, in 
both cases, what I do depends on what prediction it makes, these different predictions 
                                                             
14 Fischer, Free Will and Moral Responsibility, 26.  
15 Bok, Freedom and Practical Reason, 146. 
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would not converge on a single action, and the Pocket Oracle would be unable to make 
any prediction at all.16 
It is easy to see her logic at work when the owner of the Pocket Oracle, Mr. 
Unpredictable, wants more than anything to be unpredictable. Therefore, the Pocket 
Oracle knows that if it predicts he will choose heads, he will instead choose tails, and 
vice versa.  The possible predictions, namely that Mr. Unpredictable will choose heads or 
tails, do not converge on a single action. Furthermore, there is no way that the Pocket 
Oracle can be correct in its prediction.  It is necessary for the Pocket Oracle to stay silent 
to preserve its infallibility.  
The more complicated case is when the owner of the Pocket Oracle is Mr. 
Obedient. Instead of doing the opposite of the Pocket Oracle, Mr. Obedient knows the 
Pocket Oracle is infallible, and therefore does whatever it tells him to do, because that is 
the one inevitable course of action. So if the Pocket Oracle predicted he will choose 
heads, he will do so, and vice versa. Since there are multiple possible actions, predictions 
also cannot converge on a single action in this case. However, it seems that the Pocket 
Oracle could get around this. For instance, it could calculate what Mr. Obedient would 
have done had he never asked the Pocket Oracle, and use that as its prediction.  
One possible response to this is that even in the case of Mr. Obedient, the Pocket 
Oracle is no longer simply predicting an action, but causing it. So while that could still 
lead to an infallible prediction, there is a sense in which its actual predictive power is 
compromised. The Pocket Oracle would have to do more to predict Mr. Obedient actions; 
it would actually choose the action Mr. Obedient will take. The resulting outcome would 
                                                             
16 Bok, Freedom and Practical Reason, 146. 
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say more about Mr. Obedient’s dependence on the Pocket Oracle than the actual 
predictability of his actions. Also, we naturally assume that determinism implies there is 
always only one possible action anybody could ever perform.  Since the Pocket Oracle 
could choose from different actions that Mr. Obedient performs in itself is further 
evidence that genuine alternatives can exist even if determinism is true.  
The only way the Pocket Oracle can reveal its prediction to you before you 
deliberate is if the outcome of your deliberation does not depend on that prediction. Bok 
believes this could be true in cases of local fatalism, temptation and indifference to the 
prediction.17 Cases of local fatalism are those where the outcome of your actions is 
already decided independent of your deliberation. For instance, if you climbed a 
mountain and unluckily an avalanche swept you off your feet, then deliberation about 
whether to go left or right as you ride the wave of snow is futile. All possible paths you 
could take lead to one possible outcome, and that is to tumble down. In a sense, this is 
like Van Inwagen’s example of a locked door because even if you could still deliberate 
about which door to choose, if you leave, it must be through the open door. Yet even in 
that case, you could still decide whether to leave or stay in the room infinitely. In this 
way, it not quite the same type of local fatalism as when you are already falling down a 
mountain and the only possible outcome is to continue to tumble.  
In cases of temptation, the Pocket Oracle will still be able to predict your action as 
long as it knows that no matter which action you reflectively endorse after deliberation, 
you will still give in to your temptation.  Consider the Cookie Monster, who has an 
                                                             
17 Bok, Freedom and Practical Reason,  147. 
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incurable weak spot for cookies. No matter what, if a cookie is in front of him he cannot 
help but eat it. Sometimes he may deliberate and decide that since it’s after dinner and he 
hasn’t had a treat all day, that he should have a cookie. However imagine things got so 
bad that health groups everywhere started calling for Cookie Monster to lose his job on 
Sesame Street if he didn’t start setting a better example for kids. After this, Cookie 
Monster deliberated and decided that eating cookies was not worth the social ridicule and 
losing his job, and so he would stop. However, it could still be the case that the next time 
he saw a cookie, his overwhelming desire for sweets intervened and he ate it, even if at 
no point before, during, or after eating it he would have endorsed that action through 
practical reasoning.  This is similar to the local fatalism case in that the outcome is 
inevitable, but different in the fact that the inevitability is a result of giving into 
temptation, rather than being a victim of circumstance. 
The third and most interesting case where the Pocket Oracle can make a 
prediction is if the subject of the oracle is indifferent to the prediction. Some contest that 
this would be impossible - one cannot coherently deliberate if he already knows the 
outcome of that deliberation. Also, it seems like simple fact that you know what you are 
going to do could have significance, even if it doesn’t directly impact your deliberation. 
This is a subtle yet very important issue that I will discuss below and further examine in 
chapter three. 
Implications of the Pocket Oracle 
Since we cannot predict our own actions, or our foreknowledge cannot factor into 
to choosing our actions, the epistemic gap between our current knowledge and the 
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outcome of our deliberation is necessary and not just an evidential claim. This means that 
even the ability to predict the future infallibly could not threaten the fact that we will 
always have multiple epistemic alternatives.  Because of this, it makes it more reasonable 
to use conditional possibility and consider all of the options available under that 
conception as genuine. Essentially the claim Bok makes using the Pocket Oracle is that 
our actions can only be determined if we do not know what they are actually determined 
to be or if we can choose independently of the determined knowledge. And since we 
cannot know or use the knowledge of what our actions are determined to be, then we can 
hold all of our alternatives as legitimate when we deliberate. This is different than 
Fisher’s view, which may allow that deliberation could become irrelevant if we did 
indeed have a perfectly knowledgeable Pocket Oracle.   
Implications for Free Will 
By showing that we do have genuine epistemic alternatives, Bok believes we must 
consider ourselves free in situations requiring an epistemic perspective, namely, when we 
are using practical reasoning to decide which action we should perform. If we care about 
free will in terms of our freedom to choose which actions we want to perform, then it 
makes most sense consider the epistemic perspective, and therefore conditional 
possibility, more relevant to free will. And because the epistemic perspective is more 
relevant, and we have genuine epistemic alternatives, we should consider our wills free.  
So what does this mean for metaphysical alternatives? According to Bok’s view, in terms 
of choosing our actions, they are a trivial fact, but even her fellow compatibilists seem 
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hesitant to discount the importance of metaphysical alternatives. For instance, Fischer 
rejects Bok’s notion that deliberation implies genuine alternatives: 
When we engage in practical reasoning, either we do in fact believe that we are 
not causally determined or we do not so believe. If we do, then it is obvious that a belief 
we have from the practical perspective can come into direct conflict with a belief we 
could have from the theoretical perspective. But it is a central feature of Bok’s approach 
that the two perspectives cannot conflict in this way; the claim that the two perspectives 
cannot conflict is essential for Bok’s project of showing freedom to be compatible with 
causal determinism18. 
Fischer believes that suspending judgment about casual determinism under 
practical reasoning results in an awkward and unnecessary “compartmentalization” of the 
question of determinism. This is because Fischer rejects Bok’s claim that epistemic 
genuineness is enough for us to have genuine alternatives.  Fisher believes that since 
genuine epistemic alternatives are not enough to give us the type of genuine alternatives 
required for free will, then the compartmentalization that’s required to show epistemic 
alternatives are genuine is unnecessary.  
Fischer argues the simple fact that we know we are determined, and therefore 
only have one metaphysical choice of action, is enough to undermine the genuineness of 
our alternatives. This represents a more broad view on the nature of what it is to have 
genuine alternatives. The point of requiring genuine alternatives for free will stems from 
the belief that our actions should be in some sense unpredictable. Bok’s requirements for 
genuine alternatives implicitly only entail epistemic unpredictability, and not 
unpredictability in from an objective, metaphysical perspective. So is this unpredictability 
enough? Or do we indeed require a higher standard of unpredictability to consider our 
                                                             
18 Fischer, Free Will and Moral Responsibility, 10. 
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alternatives genuine? This question will be the focus of the next chapter, where I will use 
intuitive examples to examine exactly what role predictability plays having free will.  
Chapter 3: Foreknowledge and Predictability in the Free Will Debate 
In this chapter I will present a series of thought experiments that will help us 
consider whether Bok’s succeeds in showing that having genuine alternatives is 
compatible with determinism. The first issue is to consider the actual impact that 
foreknowledge would have on our deliberation and actions. Bok’s argument is that role of 
foreknowledge is uninteresting because it would ever dispel the need for practical 
reasoning. Therefore we will always have reason to use conditional probability and 
regard our conditional alternatives as genuine. If foreknowledge affects the outcome of 
our deliberation at all, then the Pocket Oracle’s possible prediction could not converge on 
a single action and that infallible foreknowledge would not be possible at all. But if our 
foreknowledge does not affect our deliberation, then it is as if (during our deliberation) 
we do not have that foreknowledge at all, and makes it analogous to the case where we 
cannot have infallible foreknowledge to begin with. I will first try to show that nearly all 
cases involving free will fall into the second category. I will then go onto to argue that 
even if foreknowledge would not affect our deliberation, it could have another effect that 
compromises the genuineness of our alternatives, even under Bok’s definition. My 
argument is similar to Fischer’s argument against Bok, but I will aim to demonstrate this 
exact effect through intuitive examples.  
The second issue I want to explore is the relative importance of Bok’s two 
requirements for freedom:  (1) we can choose our actions from genuine alternatives and 
(2) we have the capacity to ability to reflectively and critically endorse the action we 
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choose to take.19 Bok’s argument focuses on showing that (1) is compatible with 
determinism through practical reasoning. However, if I succeed in showing that (1) fails, 
it becomes important to ask which of these two requirements are more important to 
determining whether we have freedom. Is just having (2) enough to have freedom in even 
some sense? And if we had to define freedom based on either (1) or (2), which would we 
choose? This question brings us back to the stalemate that Bok had wanted so badly to 
avoid, but the light she sheds on the role of deliberation and predictability could more 
precisely describe what holding a compatibilist or incompatibilist view of free will 
actually amounts to.   
Predictability of Choices Relating to Free Will  
My first argument aims to show that foreknowledge of actions more relevant to the 
will would be predictable by the Pocket Oracle because those actions are more closely 
tied to what we value than lesser motivations. To do this, I first need to explain what it 
means for an action to be relevant to the will at all, and then explain why certain actions 
are more or less relevant to the will. Finally, I need to show why actions that are more 
relevant to our will are more likely to be predictable for a Pocket Oracle.  
1. What does it mean for an action to be relevant to the will? 
To answer this question, I will draw on Bok’s own definition of freedom. Bok’s 
account is modeled in part on the hierarchical motivation structure outlined in different 
                                                             
19 Bok,  Freedom and Practical Reason, 161‐162. 
Hagen 30 
 
forms by Harry Frankfurt and Gary Watson20. She gives her own twist of what this entails 
by saying that freedom of the will consists in “our ability to determine our conduct 
through practical reasoning.”21 When we base our actions on the results of our practical 
reasoning, I take the process to be as follows:  (a) My actions depend on my choices. (b) 
My choices depend on my reasons. (c) My reasons depend on the conjunction of my 
values and information about what would best maximize those values. In this tripartite 
conception, I am enfolding Gary Watson’s notion of exercising the will, namely, “the 
capacity to translate (one’s) values into actions”22 into what it means to use practical 
reasoning. In order to reason efficiently, we must have some basic system of what 
separates good reasons from bad reasons, which are inevitably rooted in some basic set of 
values I adopt in order to base my judgments.   
I take values to be the things I reflectively take to make life the most worth living, so 
that the result of maximizing them continuously for my entire life would lead me to 
conclude, if I were to reflect upon it on my deathbed, that I had lived the best life 
possible.  This makes it so when we act according to our values, or highest wants, that we 
act with a sense of reflective purpose. (a), (b) and (c) do not always hold all of our 
actions. Take (a)- if a doctor hits me in the knee with a mallet, I kick my knee out. Most 
would call this an action, but it doesn’t seem to be based on a choice at all23. 
                                                             
20 Frankfurt’s hierarchy is that there are first order desires and second order desires, where first order 
desires are lower wants than our second order ones. He gives a complete account of this in Freedom of 
the Will and the Concept of a Person (Full citation in references section). Watson’s hierarchy is based on a 
separation between reasoned values and wants of the “appetite.” This account is in his essay, Free Agency 
(full citation is also in the References section).  
21 Bok, Freedom and Practical Reason, 162 (footnote). 
22  Watson, Free Agency, 347. 
23 Some philosophers believe that intention is necessarily tied into the definition of action.  In this case, (a) 
and (b) would simply collapse into one, and would read (a) My actions depend on my reasons.  
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Furthermore, our choices don’t have to depend on our reasons; it could be that you are  a 
“lazy coin-flipper” and for every decision you make, you flip a coin because you are too 
lazy or indecisive to complete the process of practical reasoning. Conversely, there could 
be a practical coin-flipper, who believes that there are certain scenarios were the only 
rational way to make a fair decision is to use chance. One good example of a practical 
coin flipper is Harvey Dent, the noble Gotham City District Attorney. To see this, 
consider an exchange between the Joker and Dent from The Dark Knight:  
Joker: Introduce a little anarchy. Upset the established order and everything becomes 
chaos. I'm an agent of chaos. And you know the thing about chaos...it's fair. 
Dent: You live, you die. (Referencing the different sides of the coin) 
Joker: Now you're talking.24  
From that point on, Dent decided whether to kill people based on a coin-flip.  However, 
this was not because he was too lazy to deliberate over whom to kill, but rather, as a 
result of the reflective judgment that he would rather ensure fairness through chaos. 
  Lastly, your reason for choosing does not always have to be a result of the 
calculation of how to maximize the expression of your values, as (c) suggests. One reason 
is that there are many situations where your values are minimally relevant to the choice 
and subsequent action you take. For instance, if I am deciding whether to get out of bed 
or press the snooze button, it is unclear that my deepest-held-values play a definitive role 
determining whether I get up now or five minutes from now. There are plenty of other 
factors - how sleepy I am, how much time I have before my next commitment, etc., that 
don’t have any correlation to values or beliefs formed through reflective consideration. 
Another example is if somebody holds out a platter and offers you a cookie, it is hard to 
                                                             
24 The Dark Night, DVD, 2004. 
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see how choosing to take the cookie on the left rather than the one on the right reflects 
any values whatsoever.  
2. Why are certain actions more or less relevant to the will? 
I take the situations where one goes through the process I laid out earlier to be more 
relevant to the will. This is because we use this process to carefully determine the 
decisions that are most important to us. There are some choices which we consider to be 
more important than others - who to marry, which career to go into, whether to have kids, 
where to live, etc, are more important than decisions like should I wear a v-neck shirt or 
crew-neck shirt today, or should I get out of bed now or five minutes from now.  
It does not have to be a hard line between the two categories, for we can value things 
to varying degrees, and what actions we impart our value on varies from person to 
person. But the reason why we judge things more seriously is based on whether we want 
to impart our will onto our actions.  
3. Why are more relevant actions predictable? 
To consider why actions relevant to the will are more predictable than those that 
aren’t, consider an example where we directly compare a relevant and non-relevant act; a 
coin flip and a marriage proposal. 
Coin Flipping vs. Marriage 
In an example such as coin flipping, the extent of the effect of the prediction is the 
additional information that we will choose heads. However, that information can now 
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influence our decision - because if we value being unpredictable in any marginal sense, 
then the additional information prompts a change in what reasons we have to call heads, 
and therefore our actions are divergent.  
Now consider the case of who you want to marry. If the reason you want to marry 
him or her is because you believe it would lead to the happiest possible life, and you 
value happiness above else, including unpredictability, then the Pocket Oracle gave you 
that information ten minutes before you popped the question, you wouldn’t value 
unpredictability enough for it to change what you have most reason to do. Being 
predictable would minimally affect your deliberation in that it would be one reason 
against marrying your love, but it would not be enough to change the outcome of your 
decision.  Furthermore, it doesn’t seem like you would marry somebody because the 
Pocket Oracle prediction made it seem inevitable. It’s hard to envision a scenario where 
you see the name the Pocket Oracle predicts, look your future spouse up on Facebook and 
message them for their ring size.  It seems like for a decision that important, there is 
value in actually deliberating about why you want to marry them that is distinct for 
deciding that you will. After all, “the Pocket Oracle said so” would make terrible vows.   
Marriage Further Considered: The Bachelor Example 
Consider the show The Bachelor. In this show, Billy the Bachelor values love 
enough stop his life to find the girl of his dreams and risk public humiliation and 
rejection, meets twenty-five eligible women. After slowly narrowing it down to two 
women through a series of dates, he chooses one to propose to. If we consider possibility 
in a conditional sense, then Billy has twenty five possibilities of who to propose to 
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(assume he indeed proposes). Using conditional possibility would lead us to ignore 
relevant fact, like, for example, the personalities of the women or who Billy is attracted 
to.  Ignoring these facts, combined with the fact that Billy must choose from the women 
actually on the show, then at the beginning of the show it is conditionally possible for 
Billy to choose any of the twenty five women.   However, according to determinism, he 
only has one metaphysical possibility, namely, the woman he will actually propose to. 
Let’s call her Betty. Now consider how the Bachelor would react if before he even looked 
at any of the women, he was able to acquire Bok’s Pocket Oracle, and asked it which 
women he would eventually ask to marry him.  So the million dollar question becomes - 
if the Pocket Oracle gives him a name, how will he use that information going on the 
show? 
It seems implausible that the infallibility of the Oracle would lead him to call the 
producers, cancel the show, and immediately propose to Betty when he first meets her. 
Similarly, most men who know “she’s the one” don’t propose immediately, because there 
is value in going through the courting process. Furthermore, even though he knows he is 
going to propose to her, she still has to say yes.  However it is worth considering what the 
point of waiting would be if you knew that the oracle was truly infallible.   
A more important point to think about is how is foreknowledge would affect the 
process of getting to know Betty. The moment Billy meets her, he will pay extra 
attention. Maybe the Pocket Oracle will make him feel in love, or enhance his feelings 
around her.  Or maybe it will make him pay less attention to the other women.  This 
seems plausible to a certain extent, but it still seems that there will be an underlying sense 
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of curiosity - if this is the woman I going to propose to, I want to know what she’s like. 
At this point, it seems Billy would get to know Betty. Maybe he’s start talking to her and 
discover on the first date that she shares your inexplicable obsession with yo-yos, then 
you talk more on the second date and discover that you want the same things in life - to 
live near the beach and have three kids and a Labrador puppy. It seems at this point your 
reaction might be, “How did the Pocket Oracle know?! She is the woman of my dreams!” 
Even though the Pocket Oracle might have affected the process, it seems like this 
reaction shows that she is not the woman of his dreams because of the Pocket Oracle, but 
rather that she simply is, in fact, the women of his dreams, and the Pocket Oracle 
predicted it. Furthermore, once the Bachelor confirms the Pocket Oracle’s inference that 
he would fall in love with who it predicted, he would propose to her, because it is what he 
has most reason to do even considering that proposing would confirm what determinism 
tells us is true- that his actions are predictable and he only did have one metaphysical 
option.  
I am not arguing that the Bachelor will necessarily react this way, or that it is 
necessarily the case that Pocket Oracle would not affect his decision because he values 
love and marriage. I am simply arguing that it seems plausible in certain situations to 
think that foreknowledge may not matter if your values aligned to the point where your 
reasons to marry somebody transcend the influence of the Pocket Oracle. I argue that this 
is more likely in situations where deeply help values are a bigger factor in why we have 
reason to act.  
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To further show why our deliberation can render foreknowledge irrelevant to our 
choices, I will present a more concrete example that deals with deliberation in the face of 
foreknowledge. Since there are few relatable examples of genuine foreknowledge from 
real life, I will temporarily delve into the world of Harry Potter, where the existence of 
prophecies and charged decisions about whether to align with good or evil provide an 
ideal setting to think through these issues more carefully.  
Is the Connection Between Values and Free Will Legitimate in the Face of Actual 
Foreknowledge? 
A central feature of the Harry Potter series revolves around a prophecy that names 
Harry as the “Chosen One” destined to fight against Lord Voldemort to protect all that is 
good in the Wizarding World.  To help think about this in terms of Bok’s example, 
instead of receiving a prophecy, let’s imagine that Harry Potter had a pocket oracle. 
Knowing that Voldemort was gaining power, he asked, what will happen between me and 
Voldemort? The Pocket Oracle responds, “You will try to kill Voldemort.” What would 
Harry’s reaction be? It seems he would have the same response as he did when he 
discovers the terms of the prophecy - complaining to his headmaster, Albus Dumbledore: 
“It all comes down to the same thing, doesn’t it? I’ve got to try to kill him.” At which 
time, Dumbledore would ask the same question, “Imagine, please, just for a moment that 
you never heard that prophecy! How would you feel about Voldemort now? Think!” 
Even in the face of a seemingly infallible prophecy, Dumbledore tries to get Harry 
to undertake the process of practical reasoning in order to find out what he has the most 
reasons to do based on his values, desires, and information about the different factors 
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involved in his deliberation. And even though he knows the outcome, he is able to go 
through the process: 
Harry watched Dumbledore striding up and down in front of him, and thought. He 
thought of his mother, his father, and Sirius. He thought of Cedric Diggory. He thought 
of all the terrible deeds he knew Lord Voldemort had done. A flame seemed to leap 
inside his chest, searing his throat. ‘I’d want him finished,’ said Harry quietly. ‘And I’d 
want to do it.’25 
While this passage doesn’t explicitly say that Harry went through a rational 
process of weighing reasons and deliberating, it seems reasonable to infer that Harry went 
through some process of deliberation in considering whether he would rather actively 
hunt Voldemort or not. Furthermore, Harry does not seem to think that what is important 
is his ability to choose from genuine alternatives, but rather what matters is his ability to 
endorse his actions through deliberation: 
“It was, he thought, the difference between being dragged into the arena to face a battle to 
the death and walking into the arena with your head held high. Some people, perhaps, 
would say that there was little to choose between the two ways, but Dumbledore knows- 
and so do I, thought Harry, with a rush of fierce pride, and so did my parents- that there 
was all the difference in the world.”26 
In this example, the disappointment and powerlessness that Harry felt after his 
fate was handed down to him was reversed by regaining a sense of ownership over his 
actions after going through a process of deliberation and discovering that his future action 
coincided with his convictions. Furthermore, it seems that, Pocket Oracle or not, Harry 
would have tried to kill Voldemort. That is why the Pocket Oracle could make the 
prediction in the first place, because regardless of whether Harry knew he was going to 
                                                             
25 Rowling, Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince, 511. 
 
26 Rowling, Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince, 512. 
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try to kill Voldemort or not beforehand, he would have decided to take that action, simply 
because he valued loyalty to his parents, and promoting good by eradicating all evil that 
he could. Overall, Harry’s sentiment seems plausible - it is reasonable to think that if we 
were to face a similar sense of foreknowledge or inevitability, that the “ownership” we 
feel would still make a difference. And the fact that we can only take ownership over 
actions we reflectively endorse, and that endorsement is a result of our deeply held 
values, means that unless Harry considered being unpredictable to be more important 
than his other values at stake, he would choose the same course of action regardless of 
having foreknowledge of what that action would be. This implies that at least one 
purpose of deliberation is not only to decide what actions we take, but what actions we 
should endorse - that is which actions, based on our values, do we have most reason to 
perform, and even when we know what action we will take, we still have other reasons to 
undertake a deliberative process.  
Book of Your Life  
However, it is worth questioning whether this sense of ownership would always 
be enough to make “all the difference in the world.” To push this question, we will now 
consider a more extreme case of foreknowledge. In this scenario, we will examine a 
situation where, instead of there being one instance of foreknowledge, you come into 
contact with wealth of foreknowledge. Imagine that one day you receive your own 
biography. It chronicles your life from the day you were born through the day that you 
will die. You look at the publisher date, and it is ten years before you were born. In 
curiosity you read it up until you get to present day, and then stop.  
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At this point I can format the example in two ways. The first is to assume that 
next chapters in the book were written under the assumption that you would never read it. 
According to Bok, these would have to be fallible predictions, because it assumes that 
your actions won’t depend on the prediction. Since you could read the chapters about 
your future then act based on those predictions, you could render those predictions false. 
The second way to format the example is to require the predictions in the book to be 
infallible. In this case, it could only predict actions that don’t depend on your having 
foreknowledge of what those actions will be. Essentially, depending on how we set up the 
example, the next chapters of the book could contain either fallible predictions of what 
we would have done under the assumption that we were never intended to see the book, 
or contain only infallible predictions and work like the Pocket Oracle. I will consider 
each of these possibilities separately. 
  Let’s first consider the scenario is if the book contains predictions about your 
future under the assumption that you would not see the book. According to Bok, this type 
of prediction would be necessarily infallible. Therefore, knowledge of your own 
prediction would provide an increased sense of freedom in that you see a possible path 
but realize it isn’t necessary. However, an incompatibilist would argue that’s not due to 
free will but rather the fallibility of the prediction. This aside, it is seems reasonable that 
if you got this type of book, you would want to try to prove it wrong - whether to assert 
your freedom or just to test the limits of the book’s fallibility. However, an interesting 
question to ask is if you did get the urge to prove the prediction’s fallibility, what actions 
would you defy? In most cases, you would do little things, like raising your hand at a 
certain time, not asking a question in class, etc. But for major decisions, like who you are 
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going to marry, or whether you are going to attempt to eradicate evil by hunting villains, 
would you consider changing those, even if the actions the book as written down are the 
ones that you do in fact have the most reason to do? Again, when it comes to more 
important decisions that are based on values, we are more likely to sacrifice our 
unpredictability in order to do act based on what we most highly value.  
Your Life Spark Notes 
The previous example suggests that doing what we want is more important than 
being unpredictable, but is this really always the case? To think about this question, 
consider the second possible ending to the book, where it continues to be infallible. Then 
it becomes like Bok’s Pocket Oracle - the only things that would be left in the book are 
the predictions that converge on a single action, namely, where the result won’t depend 
on the knowledge you gain from the book. So what actions would be left? They would be 
the actions where even given its unpredictability, he would still have the most reasons 
take a certain action. So in a way, this book is “Your Life Spark Notes;” it contains most 
important decisions you will face in your life, along with providing the outcomes of those 
decisions. The reason it can predict these decisions is because the strength of your values 
overcomes your need to feel unpredictable, so you will perform those actions regardless 
of whether you know of them in advance. 
  According to the conclusion inferred by the one-prophecy scenario introduced 
earlier, it seems under the doctrine that only requires alternatives in a conditional sense 
and endorsement through deliberation, you could still go through your own process of 
deliberation at every sentence do see if it is what in fact you would do. In a version of 
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compatibilism with a deflated sense of sourcehood, you should still be considered free. 
This is because your decisions about which action to take depended on your own 
deliberation and that deliberation allowed you to impart your values onto your actions. 
But after a while, this exercise would become merely academic, and it doesn’t seem like 
the satisfaction of deliberating might not be enough to make you feel free in a meaningful 
way. To consider what this would actually be like, consider another analogy.  
Life as a Math Assignment 
Another way to think about this problem is that deliberating with foreknowledge 
would be like double checking the answer key to your math homework - you go through 
the steps and find your own answer, and could even have different possibilities of what 
the answer could be since you don’t use the answer key while you are working out the 
problem. It seems like you would still get satisfaction from knowing the problem in a 
way you didn’t before - you wouldn’t just know the answer, but have a thorough 
understanding the problem and solution from going through of the steps necessary to get 
to that answer. And if you are a math enthusiast, you could still derive immense 
satisfaction just from doing the problem itself.  
 However, what if you had a magic calculator that infallibly told you the right 
answer? Hypothetically you should still do the problems to get the full understanding, but 
for the average semi-slacking calculus student, if he knew that the answer key was in fact 
infallible, and showing his work was not required, why do the work if it all ended the 
same anyway?  Even for the math enthusiasts, it seems like there would be another kind 
of satisfaction - or at the very least excitement - lost in the sense that you already know 
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where your problem solving will lead. For the majority of people, problem solving for its 
own sake just isn’t as fun as problem solving to discover something you hadn’t 
previously known. Similarly, even if you are philosopher and derive immense satisfaction 
from weighing reasons and making sound practical judgments and decisions, it still 
seems like being unpredictable is still important to maintaining a sense of freedom and 
meaning in our lives.  
Implications of the Examples 
The purpose of these examples is to expose our intuitions about free will by 
pulling apart the two components we think are required to have free will: predictability 
and doing what we want. By directly pitting the two against each other we can test what 
is more important to free will; having alternate possibilities or carrying out our 
convictions. I have attempted to show through the Bachelor and Harry Potter examples 
that in a case where have only very limited foreknowledge, it seems that we value doing 
what we want to do and endorsing our actions over being predictable. However, as seen 
in the Your Life Spark Notes, the more times we must come face to face with our 
predictions, the more the knowledge of our own predictability takes a toll on our sense of 
meaning and freedom our lives possess. From this I conclude that while foreknowledge 
doesn’t always play a role in figuring out what you have the most reasons to do, it still 
seems to affect our sense of freedom. In particular, it does so by limiting the idea that our 
alternatives are genuine. I believe this supports the intuition that our alternatives are more 
closely tied to our sense of possibility tout court, rather than the conditional possibility 
we use while we deliberate.  If we have infallible knowledge of what we were going to 
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do, even if we had reason to deliberate and abstract that foreknowledge away, it would 
still not entail that we regarded our future as open to ourselves because we would in fact 
know our only available alternative even if that information didn’t impact the outcome of 
our deliberation. Bok argues that if our foreknowledge doesn’t affect our deliberation, 
then it wouldn’t affect the genuineness of our epistemic alternatives. However, I argue 
that just because the epistemic alternatives are genuine in that we necessarily have them 
when we deliberate, it does not follow that they are genuine enough to meet the 
requirement for free will. To be free, we intuitively require some sense of 
unpredictability. This is why Bok’s account initially seems plausible; if a perfect Pocket 
Oracle cannot predict our actions, then we intuitively feel we gain back a sense of 
freedom. However, if we do have foreknowledge, or if we simply know that our actions 
are indeed predictable, then even if we do not use that knowledge in our deliberation, its 
mere existence still undermines our freedom.  
If I am incorrect, and even our actions more closely related to our values are less 
predictable than I take them to be, it would mean that infallible prediction would be 
impossible in more cases. However, it is worth asking whether, if this were the case, 
would Bok have a stronger argument for why we should accept her argument for a 
deflated notion of what it means to be a genuine alternative? The answer rests on the 
difference between knowing the fact that our action is determined, against knowing what 
that act actually amounts too. If we cannot know that act, maybe we have more reason to 
regard our future as open to us. However the compatibilist must still recognize that 
regardless of whether we can fully realize it or not, if determinism is true then our actions 
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are fundamentally predictable in at least some sense, and most of us do intuitively believe 
unpredictability is related to free will in an important way.  
Conclusion   
In this thesis, I have attempted to show why Bok is mistaken in deflating the 
notion of a genuine alternative to only require multiple epistemic options rather than 
multiple metaphysical options. In the first two chapters, I explained Bok’s justifications 
for considering epistemic options genuine. First, she used the concept of a dialectical 
stalemate to show that conditional possibility is a viable alternative to possibility tout 
court. Next, she argued that each type of possibility was necessarily and exclusively 
attaches to two separate modes of reasoning: possibility tout court is used for theoretical 
reasoning and conditional possibility is used for practical reasoning. Finally, she argued 
that we can only use practical reasoning to determine our actions and therefore 
alternatives resulting from conditional possibility are genuine and provide us with free 
will.  
In response, I have offered a variety of intuitive examples to undermine Bok’s 
deflated definition of genuine alternatives. First, I used The Bachelor and Harry Potter 
examples to show that, especially in decisions most relevant to our wills, we are much 
more predictable than Bok might have us believe. I then went on to use the examples of 
Your Life Spark Notes and Life as a Math Assignment to show why metaphysical 
alternatives are more relevant to free will than epistemic possibilities.  
Ultimately, my conception of free will requires that for alternatives to be genuine, 
they must be alternatives in a metaphysical sense. Since metaphysical alternatives are 
incompatible with determinism, I must conclude that we do not have free will and 
therefore endorse incompatibilism. However, as shown in the Harry Potter example, even 
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when we know that we only have one metaphysical alternative (and by my definition that 
our will is not free) we can extract a special type of meaning from being able endorse our 
actions, even if that meaning does not quite amount to freedom.  
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